Investigating the motivation for implementing unsolicited proposals in the Sri Lankan construction industry

Abstract

Infrastructure development can be identified as a key driver of economic growth. Most developing countries have prioritised implementing new procurement arrangements to execute public infrastructure projects throughout their life cycle efficiently. Private Public Partnership (PPP) procurement arrangement is one of the popular procurement arrangements, which can be classified as solicited proposals (SPs) and unsolicited proposals (USPs). Most countries have adopted USP for infrastructure projects among those two arrangements. Nevertheless, USPs have several drawbacks than SPs, such as corruption, low social and economic benefits, low value for money, and lack of transparency. However, governments are still developing their infrastructure projects as USPs due to the government's motivational aspects towards them. Therefore, it is controversial how those motivations have a huge impact than drawbacks in implementing USPs. Thus, this study aims to investigate the motivation for implementing USPs specific to the Sri Lankan context. Accordingly, a qualitatively based extensive literature synthesis has been conducted concerning the practices of USPs. Following the qualitative approach, data were collected through twelve (12) semi-structured interviews with industry professionals familiar with USPs implementation. The findings revealed that governments often choose USPs due to limitations in their capacity to identify and evaluate large-scale projects. These limitations can be financial and technical, including a lack of expertise. While speculation exists about corrupt practices associated with unsolicited PPPs, it is difficult to validate such claims. However, it is acknowledged that unsolicited PPPs, in their current state, offer higher opportunities for corruption. Nonetheless, accessing private financing quickly and efficiently for PPPs is also a positive motivation for choosing the unsolicited approach.